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1. INTRODUCTION 
The global crisis has been a turning-point in the theoretical debate and in the policy 
preferences for architecture of financial supervision1 and the functions of central banks. 
In the late 90s, the blurring of boundaries between different financial intermediaries and 
financial markets was the main reason for a large consensus in favour of integrating 
financial supervision in a single authority, separate from the central bank. Along with this 
development, the mandate of central banks has been restricted to monetary stability, and 
their political independence was strengthened. In those years, sharing responsibility for 
financial stability between the single regulator and the central bank was often considered 
the most efficient way to deal with increasing integration between banks, other 
intermediaries, and markets, and, at the same time, the one most consistent with the goal 
of safeguarding the independence of monetary policy. Central banks often refrained from 
making any opposition to this development, possibly because the traditional focus on 
banking oversight may have seemed difficult to reconcile with the widened perimeter of 
supervisory tasks. 
In accordance with the prevailing belief that financial markets were naturally efficient and 
resilient, the pre-crisis consensus was that a low and stable inflation, together with “light 
touch” micro-prudential supervision, was also the best way to deliver financial stability.  
Actually, the risks to financial stability arising from the pro-cyclical behaviour of the 
financial system and the necessary interactions between financial supervision and 
monetary policy had already been explored since the early 2000s in the analysis carried out 
by BIS researchers (Crockett, 2000; Borio and White, 2003). However, the traditional 
“mopping-up” approach – which said that monetary policy should not react to asset prices 
bubbles, except to the extent that they affect price stability, and should only intervene after 
the bubble had burst –had characterised the central banks’ policies (Fischer, 2014).  
Experience of the latest crisis has confirmed structural vulnerabilities of liberalised and 
globalised financial systems, where price stability expectations have often contributed to 
the build-up of large financial imbalances and to increasing leverage, in overt or hidden 
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forms, in balance sheets of financial firms. At the same time, the growing role of non-bank 
financial institutions and the market-based finance have lowered the effectiveness of the 
traditional monetary policy transmission channels. This has helped to show that stable, low 
inflation is not enough to guarantee financial stability to economic systems (Kregel, 2008; 
Goodhart, 2009; Adrian and Shin, 2010; Kregel, 2014). 
The political and theoretical developments, which arose after the global crisis, have 
produced a profound reappraisal of the central banks’ contribution in achieving and 
maintaining financial stability. This evolution has had important consequences for the 
institutional architecture of financial supervision and for the role assigned to central banks 
within it. 
At the same time, the key role played by central banks during the crisis in helping to 
stabilise financial systems with conventional and unconventional measures (G30, 2015) was 
probably a deciding factor in politically legitimising their greater involvement in financial 
supervision, whose prevailing micro-prudential approach was one of the main causes of the 
crisis itself. 
The crucial role, which the central banks could claim in the new, macro-prudential 
supervision, partly by using basically the same tools used in micro-prudential supervision, 
and partly using specific instruments (CGFS, 2010), opened new perspectives into the 
traditional debate on relationships between central banks and financial supervision. 
The policies for financial stability, which go from crisis prevention to crisis management, 
and which may involve not merely banks and the payment system, but also every sector in 
the financial system, blurred the limits of responsibility held by the central banks and their 
dealings with other regulators: especially with governments, on the one hand, and the 
authorities in charge of traditional micro-prudential supervision on the other. The effects 
which the changes made to institutional architecture of supervision (understood in its 
broader sense) had upon the independence and accountability of the central banks 
therefore gave rise to a debate which was inevitably conditioned by political implications 
(Quintyn and Taylor, 2004; Westrup, 2007; Buiter, 2012; Hellwig, 2015). 
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The present study is organised as follows. In the second section the main models for the 
architecture of financial regulation are presented, with some consideration about the 
relative advantages and hazards. In the third, I shall analyse discussions about the 
advantages and disadvantages of giving central banks the responsibility for supervision, 
also in the light of their role as macro-prudential regulators.2 Evolution in models for 
supervisory architecture and the role given to central banks before and after the crisis in 
the EU have been there analysed for a selected group of countries. The aim is to find some 
associations with the degree of bankarisation, on the one hand, and fiscal costs of the crisis 
on the other. In the fourth section a comparison will be made between the reforms to 
institutional architecture proposed and/or made in the UK and Germany after the crisis. 
Finally, some conclusions are drawn.  
2. THE ARCHITECTURE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION: THE MAIN MODELS 
According to Goodhart (2007), up to the mid-90s most writers and regulators themselves 
considered the institutional structure of financial regulation to be an area dominated by 
uncontrollable and completely fortuitous political factors. It was felt to have very little 
importance in economic analysis. “Institutional reform has also been tainted by the 
suspicion that it remains the last refuge of politicians who are keen to be seen “to do 
something’ in the wake of a financial crisis.” (Taylor, 2015, p. 11). 
Changes to the financial systems’ morphology and experience of crises, however, have 
shown that, even though the models used to organise financial supervision are not 
sufficient to provide effective regulation, 3 they are still important: on the one hand, they 
should ensure that no part of the financial system can escape regulation, and, on the other, 
they should avoid that overlapping or conflicting mandates of different agencies might 
compromise proper regulation because of poor coordination between the various policies 
implemented (Wall and Eisembeis, 2000)4. In advanced financial systems, where the lines 
of demarcation between product and services have blurred, the regulatory framework must 
still guarantee the competitive neutrality, to avoid the risk that financial firms will engage 
in some form of supervisory arbitrage.5  
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Other profiles are important when assessing the alternatives: effective concentration of 
expertise; economies or diseconomies of scale in resource allocation and minimisation of 
costs for regulated firms (the problem of proportionality of regulatory burdens) (Llewellyn, 
2000); risk of undue concentration of powers and relationships between the regulatory 
authorities and the political system (independence and accountability) (Quintyn and Taylor, 
2007); relationships between supervisors and regulated firms and the problem of 
regulatory capture (rules versus discretion) (Boyer and Ponce, 2012). In the literature and in 
the minds of policymakers these various arguments may have greater or lesser importance 
in designing and implementing supervisory architecture (Taylor, 2009). The different role 
given to central banks in financial supervision shapes the institutional structure and the 
way it has developed (Masciandaro and Quintyn, 2015). However, no one institutional 
framework has proven unambiguously superior in achieving all the objectives of financial 
regulation.6 This is not merely due to the difficulty in drawing up sufficiently robust 
measures for regulator performance (Goodhart, 2001; Goodhart, 2007), but also -  and 
perhaps especially - because the ways in which supervision has been structured in a single 
country at a certain point in history reflect not only the characteristics of the financial 
system, but also specific institutional, economic, and political factors. For example, in 
many countries in the euro area, the increasing involvement of central banks in supervision 
has been brought about by their specialisation as “financial stability agencies” (Herring and 
Carmassi, 2008) because they no longer have full responsibility for monetary policy. 
However, there are many exceptions here too, as can be seen with the German Bundesbank 
(which we shall examine briefly towards the end of this study). 
Four general approaches have been discussed and adopted in different countries in recent 
years (Di Giorgio and Di Noia, 2007; G30, 2008), even though no “pure” example of any model 
may actually exist, and hybrid models are prevalent (Lumpkin, 2002; Oreški and Pavcović, 
2014). Let us now look briefly at the characteristics of each of them. 
2.1 Institutional/sectoral model 
The legal status of a financial institution determines which regulator shall be responsible 
for it in both financial stability and business conduct terms. Under this model there are 
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several specialised agencies, responsible for different type of institutions and sectors of 
financial systems (for example, banks, insurance companies, the securities industry etc.), 
which may be subject to different rules according to different risks for financial stability 
and different types of protection, which must be given to savers and investors. For example, 
under this model, whereas the central bank has the oversight of banks, specialist 
supervisory agencies are responsible for different types of institutions. 
When financial institutions are diversified and the scope of their activities include products 
and services which are functionally equivalent to the ones offered by other categories of 
financial firms, separating financial regulation by sector runs the risk of introducing 
competitive distortions, and thus increases the risk of regulatory arbitrages. The general 
trend towards functional de-specialisation of banks and the spread of universal banking 
has thus seen a progressive abandoning of this regulatory institutional framework, at least 
in its pure form.  
2.2 Functional model7 
This model can be seen as an evolution of the institutional one, to keep account of the 
integration between business areas, previously carried out by separate classes of 
intermediaries, and the spread of financial products and services which, when conveniently 
brought together, replicate the functions of traditional products and services. The 
functional approach is based upon the idea that the functions performed in the financial 
system are more stable than the institutions, which perform them and that “institutional 
form follows function” (Merton and Bodie, 1998, p. 4). Under this approach, all institutions, 
regardless of its legal status, which perform a particular function or business activity must 
be subject to the same set of rules and be under the supervision of a common regulator. In 
contrast with the institutional approach, which considers the existing institutional 
structures as given with the task of ensuring their survival, the functional perspective takes 
the functions of financial sector as given and tries to find out which institutional structure 
can best perform them. According to Bodie and Merton (1998, p. 21), “[f]unctional 
regulation promises more consistent treatment for all providers of functionally-equivalent 
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products or services and thereby reduces the opportunities for rent-seeking and regulatory 
capture.”8  
Under a purely functional approach, there are specialist agency for every business activity: 
for example, commercial banking (retail deposit-taking), life insurance, securities trading 
and underwriting, regardless of the service provider. A financial conglomerate, which 
performs all these three business activities, must therefore be subject to prudential and 
conduct-of-business regulation by the three specialist authorities. For multifunctional 
groups, this version of the functional approach has the defect of too much sharing of 
competencies around the different authorities. This model, in addition to multiplying 
compliance costs, is ineffective in crisis management: when a crisis comes, specific 
institutions are hit rather than functions. The possible solutions, which involve giving 
responsibilities to the “lead regulator” (the regulator in charge of the most important 
business sector) or to a college of specialist regulators, leave very broad areas of ambiguity 
and are not usually very effective in conflict resolution (Llewelyn, 2006).  
The effective implementation of the functional model is mostly conditioned by criteria, 
which specify the functions of financial intermediates. The practical and theoretical 
difficulty in aggregating these functions according to the risks which each of them may 
cause to financial stability and to protection for savers explains why this model has hardly 
ever been used, at least in its pure form. 
The functional model, theoretically speaking, can provide a viable solution for the problem 
of inconsistent treatment for intermediaries competing in the same market; moreover, it 
allows regulatory gaps to be covered and bring financial firms into regulation which would 
otherwise be excluded merely because their business is not covered by traditional 
institutional descriptions. This explains why it has been re-suggested in the literature as a 
possible solution to cope with the risk of migration towards shadow banking by businesses 
subject to the stricter prudential regulation, which came into force after the crisis.9  
From the late 1990s onwards,10 there has been an increasing trend towards the integration 
of financial regulatory authorities. This reflects the need to bring the institutional 
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regulatory structure in line with the characteristics of financial systems where innovation in 
products and institutions has tended to blur the traditional boundaries between sectors. 
Financial conglomeration, securitisation, and credit derivatives are the most significant 
examples of this process, which has thrown up new challenges to the traditional sectoral 
or functional supervisory architecture. In addition to efficiency in oversight and compliance, 
managing the issues of competitive neutrality and the regulatory playing field has become 
more and more complex (Llewellyn, 1999; Čihák and Podpiera, 2006; Herring and 
Carmassi, 2008). 
The two main integrated models are those usually defined as single-regulator and 
integration by objectives, or twin-peaks. The first is particularly important for the analysis 
carried out in this study, since it often (but not always)11 requires responsibility for micro-
prudential regulation to be given to some authority outside the central bank. The central 
bank should maintain responsibility for overall financial stability and overseeing payment 
systems12. 
2.3 Integrated model 1: the single regulator 
Under the single regulator model the same agency is responsible for both prudential 
supervision and conduct of business regulation of all financial sectors (banks, insurance 
and securities industry and markets). The most famous example is the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) set up in the UK in 1999 and which operated until reforms were brought in 
after the crisis in 2012. According to Briault13 (1999), the main advantages of the single-
regulator model are:  
a) Economies of scale and scope brought about by a more efficient allocation of 
resources, the harmonisation of regulatory criteria, the unification of reporting 
requirements, and the removal of duplications, overlaps and inconsistencies across 
specialist regulators. These advantages ought to reduce the costs of regulation and 
the costs of compliance for regulated firms. Goodhart et al. (1998, p. 150 et. seq.), 
however, argue that the single regulator need not necessarily deliver these 
advantages, because specialist divisions necessarily exist within a single agency, and 
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this creates potential problems in communication, information sharing, coordination 
and consistency. 
b) A more efficient and more effective resolution of conflicts between the 
different objectives of regulation is reached. This was actually one of the most 
controversial profile of the single regulator, right from when it was first established 
in the UK. The problems of possible conflicts or inconsistencies between different 
objectives, mainly between financial stability, on the one hand, and protection for 
investors on the other, have been stressed by many commentators (Hawkesby, 2000; 
Di Giorgio and Di Noia, 2007). 
c) A single regulator allows the risk of unjustifiable differences in supervisory 
procedures and competitive inequalities imposed on regulated firms to be eliminated. 
Under this model, similar risks are more likely to be treated similarly, regardless of 
where they arise, thus avoiding regulatory arbitrages. However, while a certain degree 
of harmonisation is desirable, it is important to recognise the need to preserve 
appropriate differentiation between the particular characteristics of each financial 
industry, each one requiring specific regulation. The risk of the single regulator is 
that it tends to assert itself in a dominant culture, and thus impose a “one-size-fits–
all” approach. In particular, if the single regulator is outside the central bank, the 
conduct of business objective may in practice dominate (Di Giorgio and Di Noia, 2001; 
de Luna Martínez and Rose, 2003; Turner, 2009; Schoenmaker and Kremers, 2015). At 
the same time, trying to minimise regulatory arbitrages may cause a moral hazard 
problem, because financial market participants may believe that all creditors of all 
institutions supervised by the single regulator (if it is the central bank) will receive the 
same protection. This might implicitly extend the central bank safety net from banks 
to other sectors in the financial system. This has been a powerful argument against 
the hypothesis whereby the central bank should become the single supervisor 
(Saapar and Soussa, 2000; Goodhart, 2001; Čihák and Podpiera, 2006). 
d) The single regulator is more accountable, because it has no others regulatory 
bodies to which it can transfer blame for regulatory failure. This should provide the 
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regulator with a strong incentive to establish clear mandates and areas of 
responsibility. Concerns about accountability of the single regulator have been, 
however, raised by many commentators, because of all-embracing nature of their 
role, its concentrated powers and the large discretionary powers it enjoys as to how 
best to meet different objectives (Goodhart et al, 1998, p. 152 ss.; Ferran, 2003). The 
risk of regulatory capture of the single regulator has been particularly stressed by 
Boyer and Ponce (2012)14.   
2.4 Integrated model 2: integration by objectives (twin-peaks)  
In a supervisory model integrated by objectives, separate agencies would be assigned 
responsibility for each objective of financial regulation: systemic stability, safety and 
soundness of financial firms, consumer protection and other rules for conduct of business. 
The most renowned model of integration by objectives is the twin-peaks approach proposed 
by Taylor (1995). Under this model there are only two separate agencies. The prudential 
peak is responsible for systemic stability, for supervision and crisis management of all 
potentially systemic institutions (banks and systemically relevant financial institutions) and 
overseeing systemically important payment and settlement systems. The conduct of 
business peak focuses on market misconduct and all issues related to information 
asymmetries between financial firms and clients and investors, throughout all sectors of 
financial system. The central bank, in the pure version of this model, should be the 
systemic risk regulator, as the micro and macro-prudential supervisor for at least the more 
systematically significant financial institutions (Nier, 2009). 15  
Synergies between crisis prevention (prudential regulation) and resolution arise from the 
fact that both of them have the goal to minimise the social costs of crises, in terms of 
financial instability or fiscal burdens, and both are supposed to deal with the common 
problems of moral hazards. However, such synergies must not blind us to the fact that 
resolution regimes for systemic financial institutions cannot operate without involving 
fiscal responsibility. Whether this means that responsibility for crisis resolution must be 
separate from the central bank and depend upon government is still very hotly debated.16 
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The twin-peaks model solves many of the problems caused by having a single regulator. 
Indeed, it reconciles integration objectives with the advantages of greater consistency and 
better efficiency. It is more consistent because it recognises the complementary nature of 
monetary, prudential and resolution policies; it is more efficient because, thanks to the 
independence of the authorities, it guarantees that the objectives of financial stability will 
not be sought at the expense of protection for consumers and investors, nor vice versa  
Potential weaknesses of the twin-peaks model are related to potential risks and conflicts of 
interest arising from the crucial role assigned to central bank in financial supervision, that 
are analysed in some more details in the next section.  
3. THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE CENTRAL BANK IN PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION: THE 
PROS AND CONS 
Debate about the involvement of central banks in prudential supervision has developed 
alongside a cycle, which over the past few decades has characterised the institutional 
architecture of financial supervision. Since the mid-1990s, structural changes to financial 
systems and the prevailing idea that supervision and its architecture needed to adapt to 
these developments with a market-friendly approach, promoted a concentration of 
supervisory functions, previously broken down by sectors or by functions. In different 
countries, this has given rise to a separation between the central banking and supervision, 
mostly due to worries about too much power being concentrated in a politically 
independent authority, such as the central bank. According to Melecky and Podpiera (2012), 
between 1999 and 2010, the prevalence of central banks in prudential supervision has 
diminished, mainly among countries with high financial depth, and the number of 
countries which chose to integrate in a financial authority outside the central bank has been 
higher than those which have integrated supervision into the central bank. 
After the crisis, this trend has reversed. This is partly explained by the supervisory failures, 
which contributed to the crisis, but it is mainly due to the “discovery” (better, the “re-
discovery”) by policy makers and regulators of macro-prudential supervision and the 
synergies between this and traditional micro-prudential supervision (Dalla Pellegrina et al, 
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2013)17. Therefore, after the crisis many countries have opted for greater central bank 
involvement in financial supervision, with the UK and the US being the most significant 
examples. At the same time, however, the financial stability powers, which government has 
tried to appropriate for itself have increased in consideration of the important fiscal effects 
to which systemic crises can give rise. 
At a theoretical level, the interactions between central banking and prudential supervision 
seam clear: the central bank is concerned about the safety and soundness of financial 
firms for the implications it may have on the payments system, on the transmission of 
monetary policy, and on the financial stability. Prudential supervisors, for their part, are 
concerned about the effects that central bank’s policies may have on the liquidity, 
profitability, and solvency of financial firms. These interactions and the best institutional 
way of dealing with them have now become more complex after a global rethinking of 
supervisory functions, in the light of the conflicting interpretations of financial stability 
mandate given to central banks. Distinctions and possible overlaps and conflicts between 
micro-prudential and macro-prudential supervision complicated the institutional design, 
and made the role to be assigned to the central banks more ambiguous. 
Macro-prudential mandates have been assigned either to the central bank (or a specific 
committee under the central bank), or to a board where the central bank, the supervisory 
authorities and the government are all represented. Even though in the governance of these 
new macro-prudential councils the central bank is always given an important role (at least 
in analysing overall macro-prudential risks), the implications for the various institutional 
solutions are very different (BIS, 2009; BIS 2011; Głuch et al, 2013)18. 
Traditionally, arguments for combining or separating prudential supervision with central 
banking can be grouped into several main basic categories, as shown in Table1. 
The most common argument in favour of combination concerns the information and 
expertise synergies, which this solution may create. As lender of last resort (Goodhart and 
Schoenmaker, 1993 and 1995; Padoa-Schioppa, 2002), the central bank takes on a credit 
risk, which it, like every soundly managed institution, needs to monitor according to the 
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credit worthiness of its counterparties. According to Cecchetti (2008), separation between 
bank supervisors and the central bank does not permit the latter, as liquidity provider, to 
assess the impact of monetary policy on solvency and bank liquidity, and to internalise the 
trade-offs between contrasting objectives. “Internalization of the trade-offs means that 
central bank is best positioned to decide whether actions aimed at calming financial 
markets today forsake macroeconomic stabilization objectives tomorrow” (p. 31). Moreover, 
as demonstrated by Peek et al (1999), confidential bank supervisory information can help 
central bank in forecasting macroeconomic variables used to guide its monetary policy.  
The synergies between systemic risk perspectives used by the central bank and banking 
supervision have traditionally been an important argument in favour of integration. The 
micro supervisor not always could be able to internalise the social costs of its policies. This 
has been seen, for example, in the pro-cyclical nature of capital requirements. As Osiński 
et al (2013) argue, many of the instruments used to control systemic risks (such as, for 
instance, risk-weights, Pillar-2 capital requirements, dynamic provisioning, leverage ratios, 
or large exposure limits) also have micro-prudential objectives. If the central bank, not in 
charge of micro-prudential supervision, is responsible for macro-prudential tools, without 
a formal hierarchical model to define which objective takes precedence over the other when 
using the same instrument, conflicts are inevitable. This is an argument in favour of 
integration. 
The central bank’s mandates for price and financial stability have traditionally raised the 
problem of conflict of interests and objectives, together with the related issue of 
reputational risk. Combining prudential supervision and monetary policy could lead the 
central bank to a monetary policy which is too loose, in order to avoid adverse effects upon 
bank profitability and solvency (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1993 and 1995; Goodhart, 
2001). On the other hands, the central bank as supervisor might be led, even during an 
economic slowdown, to impose stricter prudential requirements upon financial 
institutions. This could generate a credit crunch and price deflation (Quintyn and Taylor, 
2007; Di Giorgio and Di Noia, 2007; Hellwig 2014; Masciandaro and Quintyn, 2015).  
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The risk of moral hazard and the regulatory capture, when the supervisor is also the 
lender-of last resort and liquidity provider, is another argument frequently used against 
integration. Moral hazard is, actually, inevitable, given that it is impossible –especially 
during a period of crisis - to distinguish between banks which are short of liquidity and 
banks which are insolvent (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1995; Padoa-Schioppa, 2002). It is 
supposed to be one of the tasks of supervision to solve the problems of moral hazard, but if 
liquidity management and supervision are sitting in the same room, given the discretionary 
powers which the central bank can use in liquidity control, the risk of forbearance and 
regulatory capture could increase (Čihák and Podpiera, 2007; Boyer and Ponce, 2012). The 
risk of undermining the effectiveness of supervision will rise if the central bank uses the 
administrative powers it has been given as a supervisory authority to affect market 
behaviour (Hellwig, 2014). The “Chinese walls” between supervisory and monetary policy 
arms of central bank may however mitigate this problem (Beck and Gros, 2012). 
In the debate about the independence of central banks, which has been accentuated 
especially in the light of the policies they have adopted during the crisis, many writers have 
pointed out that the moral hazard issue has not been caused only by banks alone, but also 
by governments. This is because of the close links they have with banks and because public 
bonds are usually used as collateral for central bank’s liquidity operations, both 
conventional and unconventional. The potential fiscal effects of such interventions risk 
compromising the independence of central banks as monetary authorities (Cuckierman, 
2011; Buiter, 2012; Hellwing, 2014). Actually, the independence issue seems quite 
ambiguous: while in the past it was used to support integrating supervisory functions in 
the central bank (Abrams and Taylor, 2000), it has recently become one of the strongest 
arguments against giving the ECB supervisory powers (Masciandaro D. and Passarelli F., 
2014). 
Finally, a widening of functions given to the central bank may lead to an excessive 
concentration of powers, which could hamper the checks and balances which support its 
accountability, and increase the risk of regulatory and industry capture (Arnone and 
Gambini, 2007) 
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Empirical analyses of the factors, which explain the reforms brought in after the crisis, 
under which central banks were given greater responsibility not just for macro- but also for 
micro-supervision, have not yet given convergent outcomes. For example, Masciandaro et 
al. (2011) have shown that the degree of involvement of the central banks in supervision has 
not had a significant impact upon crisis resilience in the various countries. Dalla Pellegrina 
et al. (2013) have examined whether central bank independence and the criteria used to set 
up monetary policy objectives have influenced the choices made by policy makers when 
giving the central banks supervisory authority.  Strong political independence in monetary 
policy seems to represent a commitment to mitigate central bank discretion in injecting 
liquidity in order to help badly-supervised banks, thus resolving the problem of conflict of 
objectives between monetary policy and supervision. Meleky and Podpiera (2012) have 
shown that the number of financial crises, which a country has experienced, is a greater 
incentive for bringing together micro- and macro-supervision. However, at the same time 
they show that greater independence for central banks means less integration. 
After the crisis, several European countries have introduced radical modifications in their 
supervisory architecture with a growing involvement of central banks. A more in depth 
analysis on the relationships between these changes and the relevance of financial stability 
problems arising from the size and vulnerabilities of financial systems can be useful to 
understand the rationale of these reforms. 
Table 2 below shows the evolution between 2006 and 2015 in the institutional architecture 
of supervision in a selected group of European countries. Table 2 has been drawn up on the 
basis of two assumptions. First, the degree of financial deepening affects the supervisory 
financial architecture, i.e. the greater the degree of bankarisation is the more use will be 
made of integrated models (single regulator or twin-peaks). Second, the costs of the crisis 
have become an important factor in reforming the supervisory institutional architecture, 
with greater involvement of the central bank in the micro-prudential banking supervision. 
These hypotheses seem to be confirmed, overall, by the following: 
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a) Even if the integration trend (single regulator or twin-peaks) can be observed for 
many countries, those with a higher degree of bankarisation, in particular, France, 
Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, the UK, all have adopted integrated models.  b) The number of countries with central bank involved in micro-supervision has 
increased from 9 before the crisis to 15 after. After the crisis, several countries 
(Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, the UK) have introduced a twin-peaks model, with 
central bank as micro- and macro-supervisor.  c) Countries where the fiscal costs of the crisis were significant (Belgium, France, 
Ireland, Hungary and the UK) have modified their supervisory architecture and/or given 
a more important micro-prudential role to their central bank.  
4. EXPERIENCES OF THE UK AND GERMANY AFTER THE CRISIS 
The UK and Germany are two interesting cases when assessing the effects of the crisis on 
political choices in reforming the supervisory architecture after 2008. They show the 
complex interactions between political pressure, resistance and ambitions in the various 
existing authorities, and the country’s heritage, which characterise every stage on the path 
towards institutional reform of supervision, especially where significant supervisory 
failures have been found. 
4.1 The UK: from the single supervisor to the twin-peaks model.  
Before the crisis, the UK framework for financial services and financial stability was based 
on the so-called Tripartite Regime. The Financial Services Authority (FSA) was responsible 
for prudential and conduct of business regulation of all financial sectors; the Bank of 
England, operationally independent of government, had the task to ensure monetary and 
financial stability, with a surveillance function over potential threats to financial stability; 
the Treasury was responsible for the institutional structure of financial regulation and 
legislation and, in the event of a crisis, for authorising certain types of financial 
interventions and keeping Parliament informed. The arrangements for dealing with a 
possible crisis were set up in a Memorandum of Understanding, which required the Bank 
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of England and the FSA to alert the Treasury to cases with potential system-wide 
consequences. 
The catalyst for change was the 2007 Northern Rock failure (House of Commons, 2008). 
During the parliamentary debate, the very workings of the Tripartite Regime were put 
under discussion, and the criticisms of the FSA’s supervision were very severe. It was 
accused of having “systematically failed its duty as a regulator”. Attempts by the FSA to 
keep its role as regulator with an ambitious Supervisory Enhancement Programme 
(Turner, 2009) were unsuccessful. Radical reform of the supervisory architecture was 
brought in by the new Tory government, which came to power in 2010, and became law in 
the Financial Services Act 2012. Under this reform, the Bank of England came back to the 
centre of financial regulation. 
This reform took over from the Tripartite Regime with a twin-peaks model, and gave the 
Bank of England more formal powers over macro-prudential regulation through a newly 
established Financial Policy Committee (FPC). The task of the micro-prudential regulation 
for banks, insurance and major investment firms was given to the Prudential Regulatory 
Authority (PRA), created as a subsidiary of the Bank of England. For the conduct of 
business regulation, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) was set up, a separate 
institution from the central bank, and it was also assigned the responsibility for the micro-
prudential regulation of financial services not supervised by the PRA, (e.g. asset 
management, hedge funds, many brokers and dealers and independent financial advisers). 
Major changes were also made to the governance of financial crisis management 
arrangements. The Bank of England has been designated as the resolution authority for 
central counterparties, and for banks and all financial firms supervised by the PRA. The 
Governor of the Bank of England has the specific duty to notify the government if there is a 
material risk to public funds. The Treasury (HMT) has powers of direction over the Bank in 
relation to provision of financial support to a financial firm or to the use of stabilisation 
powers, when necessary to resolve or to reduce a serious threat to financial stability. 
One crucial problem with this reform was cooperation and coordination among the Bank of 
England’s diverse functions: monetary stability, tasked to the Monetary Policy Committee 
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(MPC); financial stability, entrusted to the FPC, and micro-prudential regulation to the 
PRA. Indeed, minimising potential conflicts, reducing overlaps, and exploiting synergies 
are essential if an integrated regulatory and supervisory framework is to work properly. The 
solution was mainly found via information sharing mechanism. The most important of 
these is cross-committee memberships: the Governor chairs all three bodies, and there is 
further cross- membership of internal members. 
Distinguishing the FPC and the PRA’s powers and instruments has been another important 
profile of the reform. In addition to its powers to make recommendations to the other 
authorities, the FPC was also given the task of deciding which counter-cyclical capital 
buffers or sector capital buffers and leverage ratios were to be applied: these decisions 
were to be binding upon the PRA. However, the FPC cannot involve itself in matters relating 
to specific firms, which are the sole responsibility of the PRA (Fisher, 2014). 
The reform process in the UK does not yet seem complete. Recently, in October 2015, the 
government introduced a new Bill into Parliament, to bring the PRA within the Bank of 
England. After de-subsidiarising the PRA, its functions will probably be transferred to a 
new Prudential Regulatory Committee at the Bank of England. The declared purpose of 
this proposal is to strengthen and simplify the Bank’s internal governance and “allow it to 
benefit from having monetary policy, macro-prudential policy and micro-prudential policy 
under the aegis of one institution” (HM Treasury, 2015, p. 4). 
4.2 Germany: a missed reform 
The current Germany structure of financial supervision started in 2002, when a new 
integrated supervisor, the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) was created, 
reporting to the Ministry of Finance. BaFin replaced and took over the supervisory functions 
of the three previous federal authorities responsible, respectively, for banking, insurance, 
and securities trading. The banking supervision was entrusted to BaFin, which is the 
designated competent authority. BaFin, however, share this task with the Bundesbank. A 
Memorandum of Understanding sets out their respective roles in day-by-day supervision. 
According to the Memorandum, the Bundesbank was given most of the operational tasks. It 
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means performing on-site and off-site monitoring of banks under the guiding principles 
issued by BaFin, in agreement with the same Bundesbank. BaFin, however, has final 
powers of enforcement of these measures.  
Quaglia (2008, p. 70) points out that, according to a gentlemen’s agreement, the BaFin 
supervises mainly large banks (both private and public, as Landesbanks), whereas the 
Bundesbank mainly supervises local banks.  
The German reform of 2002 had many similarities with the UK reform, which saw the 
setting up of the FSA as single regulator. There are some important differences, however: 
BaFin is not an independent authority, because it reports directly to the Minister of Finance, 
and it is supported by the Bundesbank in banking supervision, according to a “dual 
supervision” approach. 
The reasons for the reform were mainly dictated, on the one hand, by changes to the 
structural characteristics in the German financial system and, in particular, by the increase 
in size of financial conglomerates (Allfinanz). On the other, there was the need to promote 
Frankfurt as a financial centre in competition with London. The pressures coming from 
financial industry were therefore given due consideration in going ahead with integrating 
supervision. Unlike the Bank of England, the Bundesbank at the time was strongly opposed 
to any reform, although unsuccessfully. This contradicted the traditional argument it had 
always supported in the years before the EMU, according to which the same body should 
not perform monetary policy and banking supervision. The ECB, called upon to give its 
opinion on the German reform, took the side of the Bundesbank, stressing that “the close 
involvement of national central banks in prudential supervision is a mandatory condition to 
allow the Eurosystem to contribute adequately to monitoring the risks to financial stability 
in the Euro Area” (ECB, 2001). 
In 2009, with support from the new centre-right government, the Bundesbank pulled out 
again its old ambition for a more important role in financial supervision. Just like the FSA in 
the UK, BaFin was considered in Germany – rightly or wrongly – to be responsible for the 
banking upsets, which had struck the country in 2007/2008. According to the IMF (2008, 
 
 
22 
 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme 
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800 
p.23), the significant subprime-related losses sustained by several medium banks, private 
and public (e.g. Sachsen Landesbank, Westlandebank, IKB, Hypo Real), had come about 
because neither the Bundesbank nor BaFin considered the “unusual nature of the banks’ 
off-balance-sheets activities and the liquidity commitments to their conduits” alarming, 
even though they ought to have been fully aware of this.  
The “dual supervision” model had been shown to be unreliable because there was no 
efficient way for the authorities to coordinate: this weakened accountability and increased 
the risk of assessment error and delays in dealing with problem situations. However, 
perhaps even more important in providing a reason for the reform proposal were concerns 
about the Bundesbank’s role in the new authorities of the European System of Financial 
Supervision. Especially in the European Banking Authority the Bundesbank wanted to be 
adequately represented, but the fact that BaFin was the designated German authority for 
banking supervision relegated the Bundesbank to a secondary position on the EBA board, 
where it could sit, but without voting rights. 
In the opinion of many, the new Bundesbank President, Axel Weber, was the architect of the 
proposal to bring in a twin-peaks model to Germany, making the Bundesbank the micro-
prudential and macro-prudential supervisor and giving BaFin supervision for conduct of 
business (Engelen, 2010). Weber, actually, has said several times that “the Bundesbank 
stands ready to assume greater responsibility in supervision,” because “the independence 
of monetary policy and a more prominent role in the supervision of banks and insurance 
companies can be reconciled” (Weber, 2009, p.4 and 5; Weber, 2009b). In an attempt to deny 
the suspicious, raised by the new government’s reform project, Weber gave authorship for 
them to the political parties that had won the federal elections. 
In the end, the proposed reform never went through. According to Hellwig (2014, p. 44) “the 
Bundesbank itself demurred when it realised that this task [financial supervision] might 
threaten its independence.” It is however likely that, among the various factors which came 
out during the political discussions, the pressures coming from major financial groups, 
strongly against any concentration of supervisory powers in the Bundesbank, have had a 
prominent role (Deutsche Bank Research, 2009).  
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
Central banks, as bankers of banks, have always had a very important role in banking 
supervision. Changes to the structures in financial systems have led to a blurring of the 
traditional differences between sectors in financial systems. The very specificity of banks 
requiring a special supervisory regime, especially because of the interactions between their 
solvency, liquidity, and smooth-operation-of-payments system, has been partly allayed. 
With the wisdom of hindsight, this evolution should have implied that functions assigned to 
central banks in crisis prevention and management should have been extended over all 
intermediaries with systemic importance. The diminished importance of traditional 
commercial banking within financial systems contributed instead to call into question the 
central banks’ role in prudential supervision. 
In many ways, the crisis was a turning point in this development. The new role of the 
central banks in safeguarding financial stability, and the crucial importance of macro-
prudential policies are the main reasons why the architecture of supervision needed to be 
revised, both theoretically and by policy makers. 
There is today a broad consensus, on the one hand, that monetary stability and financial 
stability are two sides of the same coin and, on the other, that there are underlying 
synergies and interactions between micro- and macro-supervision. The most efficient 
institutional solutions are instead still disputed, because of the difficulties in specifying 
which models are most suitable for the economic and political reality of each individual 
country and because of inertia carried forward from the past.  How supervision is 
conducted is surely more important than who is in charge of it, but there is often a very 
close association between these two profiles, which reflects a tradition of institutional 
expertise and sensitivity, which any reform will find it difficult to underestimate. 
There is probably no perfect model for supervisory architecture; the balance between pros 
and cons in the involvement of central banks in prudential supervision remains ambiguous 
on a theoretical level. Financial supervisory reforms are always a political process, where 
the final word can only be given by summing up the interests of opposing sides. 
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Theoretical consistency, however, is the only yardstick we can use to judge any solution. In 
this perspective, the central banks – in view of the crucial role they are inevitably called 
upon to play in financial crisis management – cannot fail to step up to take responsibility 
for crisis prevention, of which prudential supervision is such a vital part. The worst 
reputational risks, which might stem from this, are probably a fair price to pay. 
Once again, perhaps, British central banking has shown us the path to follow.  
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1 The term supervision is used to describe the regulation/supervision system, because the 
border between regulatory and supervisory tasks is blurred due the large rule-making 
powers formally or informally delegated to supervisory bodies. 
2 Developments in the architecture of financial regulation in the EU have been examined in 
a separate study as part of the FESSUD programme (Montanaro, 2015). Reference will only 
be made here to national experiences.  
3 According to Abrams and Taylor (2000), the institutional structure of supervision is a 
second order issue, in the sense that there should first be in place conditions for effective 
supervision, i.e. clear objectives, independence, accountability, adequate resources and 
enforcement powers.  
4 With reference to banking supervision, the Basel Committee (BCBS, 2012), Core Principle 
1 states: “An effective system of banking supervision has clear responsibilities and 
objectives for each authority involved in the supervision of banks and banking groups. A 
suitable legal framework for banking supervision is in place to provide each responsible 
authority with the legal powers to authorise banks, conduct ongoing supervision, address 
compliance with laws and undertake timely corrective actions to address safety and 
soundness concerns”.  
5 Abrams and Taylor (2000), however, stress that complete regulatory neutrality should not 
be a primary objective of supervision, because the potential systemic costs associated with 
failure of financial institutions may be very different. 
6 The key policy goals of financial regulation include safety and soundness of financial 
institutions; mitigation of systemic risks arising from fragilities of the overall functioning of 
the financial system and from systemic financial institutions, markets and infrastructures; 
fairness and efficiency of markets and protection of investors and consumers. The first two 
refer to financial stability (micro- and macro-prudential supervision), and the latter two 
mainly to market integrity and conduct of business rules, generally considered together. 
Traditionally, systemic risks have tended to focus on banks and payment systems, usually 
subject to oversight by the central bank. Micro-prudential regulation involves all the 
categories of financial institutions. For banking, however, there has always been a special 
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supervisory framework, often entrusted to the central banks. This is both because banks 
are generally viewed as systematically sensitive, and because there are strong synergies 
between bank supervision and lending of last resort. The main goals of special banking 
supervision have traditionally been protection for savers and curbing the moral hazard 
caused by the fact that public safety net (lender of last resort and deposit insurance) 
protect not only small depositors, but also – and especially – the banks themselves, 
particularly those which are too-big-to fail. However, in the modern financial systems, 
where many financial intermediaries perform some of the traditional functions of banks, 
mainly risk and maturity transformation, a systemic approach to financial supervision 
cannot be limited to the banks alone.  All institutions providing retail financial services are 
subject to conduct of business regulation. Market integrity and protection of investors and 
customers of brokers and dealers are, on the other hand, the primary objectives of 
securities regulation.  
7 The functional approach to regulation should not be confused with the so-called functional 
regulation of banks, developed in line with the original proposal of the “narrow bank”, 
which implies both that only pure monetary institutions should have access to the payment 
systems, and that the asset portfolio of narrow banks should be legally separate from the 
affiliate lending firms (Philipps, 1995). On this theoretical approach, which entails a 
separation between the banks’ functions of maturity transformation and liquidity supply, 
see also Kregel (2014).  
8 The UK’s model adopted after the Big Bang of the early 80s provides a classical example 
of this approach in its pure form: the scope of the banking activities was defined by 
reference of “deposit-taking” function; that of securities regulation, by reference of 
“investment business” etc.  For the financial groups engaged in banking and securities 
activities, the Bank of England was responsible for supervising the banking activities and 
the functional regulator for supervising investment business, if conducted by a separately 
incorporated securities subsidiary. If, however, the bank itself conducted the bank’s 
securities business, the central bank was the “lead” regulator, responsible for overall 
safety and soundness oversight, and the functional regulator was in charge of solvency 
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supervision of the subsidiary. The cooperation between the two supervisors came under 
“supervisory colleges” (Montanaro, 2016). 
9 One example of functional regulation is that suggested by Montanaro and Tonveronachi 
(2012): according to this proposal, all leveraged financial institutions, which perform risk 
and maturity transformation, should subject to the same rules and the same supervisory 
measures. The same line has been taken by Acharya (2015), who argues that, in order to 
design a macro-prudential regulation able to deal with shadow banking and regulatory 
arbitrage, central banks should employ capital and liquidity requirements based on the 
features of underlying financial transactions rather than the specific institutional form of 
financial firms.  
10 A significant exception can be seen in the three Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden, 
and Denmark), where the integrated regulatory model was brought in many years ago, 
between the late 1980s (Norway and Denmark) and the early 1990s, after the crisis 
(Sweden). In all three countries, the central bank was never in charge of supervision: the 
single regulator therefore arose out of the integration of many previous bodies, and was 
only tasked with prudential functions. Rule-of-conduct regulation was entrusted to sector 
Ombudsmen. The integration of financial supervision was mainly justified by the expected 
economies of scale, which were especially important in these countries where the financial 
system, outside the banking and insurance sectors, was still relatively underdeveloped. In 
1993, Finland, after the crisis, took a completely different approach from the other three 
Nordic countries: it replaced its Banking Inspectorate, which was an agency reporting to 
the Minister of Finance, with a Financial Services Authority, administratively linked to the 
central bank. The Finnish FSA is not a single financial regulator in the narrow sense, 
because it is only responsible for banking and securities regulation. Finland’s decision not 
to adopt a pure integrated approach was explained by two needs: to make supervision 
independent of political control, and to use the tried and tested capabilities of the central 
bank in crisis management (Abrams and Fleming, 1999). 
11 Unlike the British model of single supervisor (taken up in many other countries from the 
early 2000s onwards), the integrated model adopted in 2002 by Germany with the institution 
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of BaFin implies an important involvement of the Bundesbank in operational aspects of 
banking supervision. This model, commonly known as “dual supervision,” has since been 
implemented in Austria. 
12 According to Nier (2009, p. 42), “the single integrated structure has not been adopted 
with macro-prudential objectives in mind. As a result, responsibility for macro-prudential 
policies is often not clearly assigned, and accountability for macro-financial outcomes is 
lacking”.  
13 Clive Briault served for many years at the FSA, as its Director of Prudential Standard 
Division. 
14 According to Taylor (2015, p. 20), experience with the British single regulator shows that 
the concerns about the excessive concentration of powers were actually misplaced. The 
“light touch” style of supervision which characterised the FSA’s regulatory philosophy 
meant that FSA never made full use of significant powers that it could have exercised, 
actually delegating many supervisory tasks to firms’ internal risk management systems 
within a framework of general principles. 
15 In the twin-peaks model adopted by the Netherland from 2002, the central bank serves as 
the prudential and systemic regulators of all financial firms, including banking, insurance, 
pension fund and securities. In Australia, though, the first country to adopt the twin-peaks 
approach, the prudential authority is separated from central bank and independent (Taylor, 
1995). 
16 The European regulation for bank recovery and resolution is emblematic: even though 
Directive 2014/59/EU (BRRD) requires structural arrangements to be in place to ensure 
operational independence and to avoid conflicts between supervisory and resolution 
functions, most national central banks have also been given resolution authority (EBA, 
2013). 
17 The main objective of macro-prudential policy is to mitigate the pro-cyclical effects of the 
financial sector and the risks linked to concentration and interconnectedness. Several 
studies seek to identify and classify macro-prudential instruments (CGFS, 2010; G30, 2010; 
Schoenmaker and Wierts, 2011; Knot, 2014).  
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18 The institutional arrangements for macro-prudential supervision vary widely throughout 
various jurisdictions. In particular, there are significant differences between the European 
experience and the USA, due to different level of centralisation and different powers being 
awarded to the central banks. In the EU, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), with 
representatives from central banks and supervisors plus one member of the European 
Commission, does not have direct authority over any policy instruments, but only the power 
to issue recommendation and risk warnings concerning systemic risks to competent 
authorities at both national and European level. These recommendations carry an “act or 
explain” obligation and could be made public only under certain circumstance. The 
leadership of ESRB is held de facto by the ECB:  its President is the chair of the ESRB, and 
the ECB ensure analytical, statistical, administrative and logistical support.  
Along with Single Supervisory Mechanism within the banking union, macro-prudential 
tasks of the ECB are significant. Even though the national regulators with responsibility for 
systemic risks oversight remain responsible for macro-prudential tasks, the ECB may 
autonomously decide to impose countercyclical capital buffers or, in general, more (but 
never less) stringent prudential requirements than the actions taken at the national level. 
The purpose is to prevent passiveness in the pursuit of macro-prudential policy by national 
authorities, as the deployment of these instruments is unpopular and tends to meet with 
the opposition from the industry (regulatory capture). The macro-prudential tasks 
conferred to the ECB may affect any credit institutions in a euro area country, and not only 
those classified as significant, directly supervised by the ECB. However, the non-banks 
financial firms are outside the mandate of the ECB as macro-prudential supervisor.  
In the US the Dodd-Frank Act created a new centralised multiagency macro-prudential 
body, the Financial Services Oversight Council (FSOC). The FSOC, even though has not the 
rule-writing power of an enforcement authority, has powers to recommend and, in some 
cases, require actions by member agencies. In the FSOC the role of central bank is less 
prominent than in the European ESRB, because it is chaired by the Secretary of the 
Treasury, and the chairman of the Board of Governor is only one of ten voting members. 
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Further, the main analytical support body is housed in the Treasury. The Federal Reserve, 
unlike the ECB, is the prudential supervisor for all systemically important firms (including 
non-banks), with the express powers to adjust prudential standards for macro-prudential 
objectives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme 
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800 
!
 
 
 
 
32 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme 
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800 
!
 
Abbreviations used in the Table: 
Micro-prudential Framework: CB = Central Bank; IO = integration by objectives (this model 
is generally adopted in some hybrid form: in the Table a country’s model is classified 
integrated by objectives when a single regulator is responsible for prudential/conduct of 
business supervision for at least two sectors of the financial system); TP = twin-peaks; S= 
sectorial; SS = single supervisor (autonomous from CB).  For all Euro-area countries the 
primary responsibility of banking supervision has been transferred since 2014 to ECB, 
inside the SSM of the Banking Union. In the Table, however, reference is made only to 
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national authorities.  Macro-prudential framework:  BCB = board chaired by central bank; 
BS = board chaired by supervisor; BG = board chaired by government; BC = central bank or 
a specific committee inside the central bank; G = government.  
Sources: Supervisory models: ECB (2010); G30 (2008); Schoenmaker (2011); Oreški and 
Pavković (2014), ESRB (2014); Knot (2014) and online official information. Data: Bank total 
assets/GDP: ECB Statistical Warehouse; Fiscal cost of banking crisis/GDP: Laeven and 
Valencia, 2012.  
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